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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
01~

THE

STATE OF UTAH
\

STATE OF UTAH,

\

Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

CASE

No. 1132

GRANT ALLEN ADAMSON,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from the Third Judicial District Court,
Salt Lake County, Utah,
Hon. M. J. Bronson, Judge, Presiding

Trans. Pa.re

STATEMENT OF FACTS
109

In spite of the lack of evidence presented by the
State, the lower court refused to dismiss this case of
involuntary manslaughter, and the defendant, Grant
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Allen Adan1son, was convicted, as the result of a collision
between the gasoline truck which he was driving and the
bicycle ridden by a boy, Sylvester Kanon, who was killed
by the ilnpact. The collision occurred at the intersection
85 of Dth South Street and 2nd West Street in Salt Lake
City, as the defendant was making a left turn from 2nd
\Vest Street into 9th South Street. Although it was
114 dark, the bicycle had no light and was in the middle of
the road.
The State failed so completely in presenting evidence
of any negligence of the defendant that the defendant
himself was not put on the stand to testify. The only
testimony of the defendant's speed at the intersection of
115 the accident was that he was driving slowly. The State's
sole witness of the defendant's speed, C. E. Moulton, did
not testify what the defendant's speed was at the time
of the accident nor immediately before it. It was somewhere between 3rd South and 9th South Streets that
Moulton looked at his speedometer and found that the de74 fendant was going between 38 and 40 miles per hour. He
did not say where it was on 2nd West Street that the
defendant was going at this speed~ It may have been
five blocks away from the scene of the accident. This
witness claims he was sure of this speed; yet he had
testified at the preliminary hearing that this speed was
80 between 35 and 38 miles per hour. There was also some
equivocation on his own rate of speed as compared with
that of the defendant. On the night in question (August
5, 1940) Grant Adamson, the defendant, was driving a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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82

81
120
115

gasoline truck southward on 2nd 'Vest Street in Salt
Lake City. The witness l\Ioulton was stopped in the
drive,vay of an ice crean1 parlor on the west side of 2nd
West Street bet,veen 3rd and 4th South Streets, as the
defendant rode past hin1. He started up and caught up
with the defendant. On cross examination he admitted
that in doing so he increased his rate of speed above that
of the defendant's, and on redirect examination he corrected himself to agree with the prosecution's leading
statement that his car 'vas going at ''about'' the same
rate of speed as that of the truck at the time he made
the check. This sole witness of speed, however, himself
testified that the truck slowed down at the intersection
of the accident. Other testimony showed that the truck
was going slowly at the intersection.

The semaphore light was green toward the north
and south when the defendant made his left turn. There
83,84 were lights on at two service stations on the east side
of 2nd West Street at the northeast and southeast corners
87 of the intersection. Except for these lights it was dark.
A Model "A" Ford automobile traveling north on
2nd West Street crossed the intersection before the de114 fendant made his turn. The deceased Sylvester Kanon
was riding an unlighted bicycle north on 2nd West Street,
somewhere behind the Ford automobile, carrying something in a paper sack in one hand. The collision occurred
approximately 44 feet north of the south curb of 9th
99 South Street. The body was found 18 feet from the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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supposed point of impact, and the bicycle 35 feet from
this supposed point, toward the side of the road. The bicycle was scraped along the road by the truck. The truck
continued southeast and stopped at the side of 9th South
Street 157 feet from the supposed point of impact.
107

There were no skid marks or tire marks of any kind.
There was a scratch mark in the center of the truck's
bumper and milk spilt over the windshield and left fender.
A fruit jar bottle top was on the fender.

101

100
98

106

Second West Street north of 9th South Street is a
highway wide enough for four-lane traffic - 83 feet
wide-but it narrows south of 9th South Street to a twolane highway, 45 feet wide. Vehicles traveling north from
a point south of 9th South Street, unless they turn to the
right, drive into the center lane of the two north bound
lanes of traffic after they cross 9th South Street. If a
line were projected due north from the east curb of 2nd
West Street, south of 9th South Street, it would fall 22
feet west of the east curb of 2nd West Street north of
9th South. Traffic following the curb would necessarily
turn in a northeast direction at 9th South Street. The
pedestrian lane runs in a northeast-southwest direction
so that a north bound pedestrian crossing 9th South
Street would, to stay in the pedestrian lane, travel
not due north, but northeast, e v e n in a m o r e
easterly direction than a line running across Ninth
South Street from corner to corner of the curbs. The
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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bicycle did not follo\v either the curb direction or the
pedestrian lane. It passed directly in front of 'vitnesses
87 \Villian1 and Thomas ~.,owler, t'vo or three feet
away from them as they 'vere standing on the east curb
89, 115 of 2nd \\;est Street south of 9th South and continued
straight north. The indicated point of impact is on a line
almost directly north of the east curb of Second West
Street as that curb continues south of Ninth South Street
(Exhibit B).
SPECIFICATION OF ERRORS

I. The court erred in refusing to recognize that the
State failed to prove the commission of the crime of
involuntary manslaughter.
The court erred in denying defendant's motion
for dismissal at the close of the State's evidence.
(1).

(2)-. The court erred in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict in favor of the defendant.
(3). The court erred in refusing defendant's requested instruction No. 1: "You are instructed to find
the defendant not guilty.''
(4). The court erred in denying the defendant's
motion in arrest of judgment.
(5). The court erred in denying defendant's motion
for a new trial.
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II. The court erred in refusi!f!g to g,ive defendant's
requested instructions and in directing the jury.

( 6). The court erred in giving the fifth subdivision
of its instruction No. 5 as follows :
"F,ifth: That it bhall be unlawful for the
driver of a vehicle within an intersection who intends to turn left to fail to yield to any vehicle
approaching from the opposite direction which is
within the intersection or so close thereto as to
constitute an in1mediate hazard."
( 7). The court erred in failing to include in the
fifth subdivision of its Instruction No. 5 all of the statute
pertinent to the right of way, to-wit:
''But such driver having so yielded and having given a signal when and as required by law
may make such left turn, and other vehicles approaching the intersection from the opposite direction shall yield to the driver making the left
turn.''
(8). The court erred in refusing to give defendant's
requested instruction No. 20 :
"You are instructed that the Salt Lake City
ordinances provide that riders of bicycles upon the
city streets shall drive as closely as practicable to
the right hand edge or curb of the street except
when overtaking or passing another vehicle or
bicycle or when placing a vehicle or bicycle in a
position to make a left turn.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(9). The court erred in refusing to give defendant's
requested Instruction No. 21 :
"You are instructed that if you find the deceased bieYeli~t 'Yas not following as closely to
the right l~and curb of the street as practicable~
then you must find that he did not have the right
of "ray over the defendant.''
(10). The court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested Instruction No. 12:

"You are instructed that the la'\v requires
that, 'Every bicycle upon a highway during the
period from a half hour after sunset to a half
hour before sunrise shall be equipped with a
lighted lamp on the front thereof visible under
normal atmospheric conditions from a distance of
at least three hundred feet in front of such
bicycle '. ' '
(11). The court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested Instruction No. 13:

"You are instructed that if you find that at
the time of the accident Sylvester Kanon was
riding a bicycle which was not equipped with a
lighted lamp that such riding was unlawful, and
if you find that his so riding was the proximate
cause of his death you must find the defendant
not guilty.''
(12). The court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested Instruction No. 14:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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''You are instructed that if you find that Sylvester !{anon drove a bicycle at the tune of the
accident which was not equipped with a lighted
lamp on the front thereof, his riding the bicycle
in that rqanner 'vas negligence and should be considered by you in connection with all other matters
pertaining to the said accident.''
( 13). The court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested Instruction No. 15 :
"You are instructed that a driver may pre8urne that others in the road will conduct themselves in a lawful manner. If you find that though
Sylvester Kanon was within the intersection or
so close thereto as to constitute an immediate
hazard he \Vas riding his bicycle in an unlawful
manner and that it 'vas because of his so riding
in an unlawful manner that the defendant Grant
Adamson failed to see him, then you must find
that the defendant Adamson did not act unlawfully in failing to yield to Sylvester Kanon. ''
( 14). The court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested Instruction No. 16:
''You are instructed that the law does not
require a person to anticipate or guard against
events which are not reasonably to be expected,
nor does the law require a person to regulate hi~
conduct with reference to the conduct of another
person which is not reasonably to be expected."
(15). The court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested Instruction No. 17:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"You are instructed that 'vhen a person is
placed 'vithout negligence on his part suddenly
in a position of peril \Yithout sufficient ti1ne to
consider all of the circumstances, the la\v does not
require of him the same degree of care and caution that it requires of a person ''Tho has an1ple
opportunity for the full exercise of hi~ jndgn1ent
and reasoning facilities."
The court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested Instruction No. 10:
(16).

''You are instructed that even if you were
to be convinced that the defendant omitted to
perform a duty, nevertheless if an unla,vful act
or negligent act of another person intervened between the omission of the defendant and the
death and was the direct cause of the death, then
you must find the defendant not guilty.''
The court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested Instruction No. 18:
(17).

"You are instructed that the Salt I_jake City
ordinances provide that riders of bicycles upon
the city streets shall drive as closely as practicable
to the right hand edge or curb of the street except
when overtaking or passing another vehicle or
bicycle, or when placing a vehicle or bicycle in a
position to make a left turn. You are instructed
that if you find that the deceased bicyclist violated the ordinance mentioned in Instruction
No.____________ you shall find him negligent, and if
his negligence was the proximate cause of his
death, you shall find the defendant not guilty.''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(18). The court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested Instruction No. 19:
''Yon are instructed that if you find that the
deceased bicyclist violated the ordinance mentioned in Instruction No. ____________ you shall find hin1
negligent, and if his negligence was the proximate
cause of his death, you shall find the defendant
not bO'uiltv."
"

( 19). The court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested instruction No. 9 :
''You are instructed that in determining
whether or not the defendant was guilty of criminal negligence as that term is defined to you in
other instructions you should consider the conduct
of Sylvester Kanon immediately prior to the accident and at the time of the accident, together with
all other facts and circumstances surrounding the
accident,''
and in modifying it as follows in its instruction No. 7A:
"You are instructed that in determining
whether or not the defendant is guilty of the crilne
charged in the information you should consider
the conduct, insofar as there is evidence thereof,
of Sylvester Kanon immediately prior to the accident and at the time of the accident together with
all the other facts and circun1stances surrounding
the accident which have been given in evidence.
If you believe from all the evidence in the case that
the sole proximate cause of the injuries to and the
death of the said Sylvester Kanon was a result of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the act~ and conduct of the said S~·lve8ter Kanon
then you should return a verdict of not guilt~'·''
( 20). The court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested Instruction No. 3 :
''You are instructed that the words, 'v\Tithout
due caution· and circumspection' as used in the
Statute of the State of Utah defining the offense
of involuntary manslaughter must be construed
as meaning 'criminal negligence'. ' '
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO RECOGNIZE THAT THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE
THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME OF INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER {Specifications of
Error Nos. 1-5).

There were four grounds alleged in the bill of par10 ticulars as a basis for the charge of manslaughter:
1.

That defendant was driving too fast-

(a). That defendant was driving at a speed greater
than was reasonable or prudent, having regard to the
traffic, surface, condition and width of the highway and
the hazard existing at the intersection.
(b). That defendant was driving at a speed which
was greater than would permit him to exercise proper
control of the vehicle and to decrease speed or to stop as
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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rnight be necessary to avoid colliding with any person or
vehicle then and there upon the highway, to-wit: that
the defendant was driving at a speed of between 25 and
30 1niles per hour.
2. That the defendant did not keep a proper or any
lookout.
3. That defendant failed to yield to Sylvester
Kanon.
4. That the defendant was driving without due
caution and circumspection and at such a speed and in
such a manner as to endanger the person and property
of Sylvester Kanon.
The evidence does not sustain the charge of involuntary manslaughter on any of these grounds.
1.

The Defendant's Speed.

In this ground we are not even involved with the
problem of whether there was evidence of speed sufficient
to sustain the charge beyond ,a reasonable doubt. There
is no evidence, at all, of speed of the vehicle at the time
of the collision or immediately before it, except that
115 Grant Adamson, the defendant, was driving slowly. The
only testimony during the whole trial of Grant Adamson's speed except that he was driving slowly was the
evidence of C. E. Moulton, who stated that Adamson was
74 going between 38 and 40 miles per hour along 2nd West
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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115

79
78

80

115
81

80

Street. There is no testi1nony of where on 2nd West
Street defendant 'vas going at this speed except that it
was some,vhere between 3rd South and 9th South Streets.
The accident occurred at the corner of 9th South and
2nd West Streets "yhile Adamson "\vas 1naking a left turn
from 2nd ,~vest Street into 9th South Street. Assuming
that this witness' testimony was reliable, still, in order
to establish that the defendant was driving at that speed
in the intersection where the accident occurred, the jury
must have arbitrarily located this speed at 9th South
Street, in direct contradiction to testimony that the defendant was driving slowly at that point. And Moulton's
testimony was not reliable: it "\vas questionable at its
best. He started up from the driveway going out of an
ice cream parlor on the west side of 2nd VVest Street
between 3rd and 4th South Streets. He drove at a speed
greater than Adamson's speed and caught up with the
defendant Adamson. Somewhere along 2nd West Street
he clocked defendant's speed and found the defendant
was going between 38 and 40 miles per hour. He was
positive of that, yet he had previously testified that the
defendant was going between 35 and 38 miles per hour.
No one knows where it was between 3rd South and 9th
South Streets that the defendant was going at this rate
of speed. In addition to the positive testimony of Thomas
Fowler that Adamson was driving slowly at 9th South
Street, Moulton himself said he thought the defendant
''did slow down some.'' At the preliminary hearing
held at about a week after the accident Moulton testified
that Adamson slowed down appreciably.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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No evidence was introduced of what speed limits
there 'vere, if any, nor of any violation of any speed
lin1it. Of course, the jury can not assume that Adamson
exceeded a speed limit; neither has the court any right to
per1nit the jury to assu1ne, because Adan1son was driving
35 or 40 1niles per hour son1ewhere south of 3rd South
on 2nd West Street that on the corner of 9th South Street
he 'vas driving at a speed greater than was reasonable
and prudent or greater than 'vould permit him to exercise
proper control of his vehicle. Yet this is what the court
did.
Even though we should assume 35 or 40 miles
per hour exceeds a speed limit, which we have no right
to do, particularly in a criminal case-and assume further-which we still have no right to do, there being no
evidence of the type of district or the traffic-that such
a speed along Second West Street was reckless, still we
cannot overcome the hurdle of the State's failure to
show that this speed somewhere along Second West
Street was the proximate cause of the accident. There
'vas no showing of defective brakes or of the weight
of the truck. Automobiles are now so constructed for
quick acceleration and slowing down that testimony of
speed at some unlocated point away from the intersection
where the accident occurred is valueless as proof of speed
at the intersection as the proximate cause of the injury.
This is particularly true in this case when the maximum
speed testified to at any point along the route was only
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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forty miles per hour. Thh~ 'vas n1entioned by only one
81 'vitness, and 'vas contradicted by his own testimony.
In Dunville v. State (Ind.), 123 N. E. 689, the defendant 'vas convicted of involuntary n1anslaughter for
violation of the speed statute. The deceased, a little girl,
ran into the street in front of his 1notorcycle. When he
unsuccessfully tried to avoid her, he threw his cornpanion
against the curb, rendering him unconscious, and his
motorcycle skidded on its pedal across the street. The
Supreme Court, reversing the conviction, said:
"The testi1nony as to his speed at the south
corner of this block and for two blocks farther
south is rather ren1ote, considering the fact that
nothing appears to sho'v hovv far these points were
from the scene of the accident. It is a 1natter of
common knowledge that motor vehicles may be
accelerated and retarded very rapidly. But whatever may be said as to the inferences that the
lower court drew from the testnnony about appellant's speed, and whether the lower court vvas
warranted in drawing the inference that he was
exceeding the speed limit of 15 miles per hour at
the time the child was struck becomes material
only when it is shown that the accident would not
have occurred just as it did had appellant been
going at a lawful rate ...
''The most the evidence discloses is negligence on the part of appellant. For aught that
appears in this case the proximate cause of Frances Held's death was the fact that she ran in front
of appellant's motorcycle and suddenly stopped.
For aught that is shown by the evidence, the acciSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Pag~

dent 'vould have occurred had appellant been proceeding in the most careful rnanner. . .
''The :finding of the court is not sustained by
sufficient evidence, and is therefore contrary to
la\v."
Not only was there no testimony of undue speed at
the place of the accident; there was no physical evidence
107 of speed. There were no skid or tire marks of any kind.
No assurnptions can or should be drawn from the location of the truck driven to the side of the road, nor from
the location of the bicycle seraped along the road, nor
from the location of the body.
To paraphrase this Court's words in State vs.
Gutheil, (98 Utah 205, 98 P. (2d) 943) : What was it that
Adamson did or did not do that shows he acted recklessly
and in marked disregard of the rights of others!
''A criminal case requires proof of each element of the crime by evidence that convinces one
beyond all reasonable doubt of the existence of
each such element. Criminal negligence evidenced
by a dereliction of some kind conforming to at
least one of the definitions we have set out, is a
necessary element of the crime charged here.''State vs. Gutheil, supra.
In short, there is a complete absence in the record of
any evidence of speed, and a fortiori of any evidence of
speed to show recklessness or conduct evincing marked
disregard of the rights of others.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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2.

Proper Lookout.

It is clear that the 111ere fact that there 'vas an accident does not show that the driver failed to keep a proper
lookout (State vs. Guth e il, supra). There is not one word
of testin1ony of Adamson's alleged failure to keep a
proper lookout. He hit a boy on a bicycle. The jury
must not be allowed to speculate from this in a criminal
case in which the facts denoting criminal negligence must
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, that Adamson was
not keeping a proper lookout at the time of the collision. The circumstances, if we make assumptions, would
87 lead to the contrary conclusion. It was dark at that time.
There was an arc light at the southwest corner and lights
were on at the service stations, but we do not know that
these lights illuminated the road where the bicycle was
proceeding. It may have been that the lights at the service stations served to confuse the outline of the boy on
the bicycle rather than to illuminate it. It is common
knowledge that a well-illuminated object alongside a dark
one frequently serves to obscure the latter. Obviously
the service station was lighted to attract attention to it,
not to illuminate the highway.
A car passed through the intersection going north
in front of the bicycle. The witness Moulton, who was
immediately behind the defendant's truck, and who was
81 watching the intersection, did not see the bicycle. Should
we not conclude then that the bicycle was behind the car
in such a position in the darkness that it could not be
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~een ·?

'l~his

is an especially reasonable assumption because the bicyclist was negligent in at least two particulars, 1nore fully discussed further on in this brief. He
114 failed to have a lamp on his bicycle, although it was dark,
101 and he was driving in the center lane rather than near
the curb. Second West Street is a two lane highway
south of 9th South Street and a four lane highway north
of 9th South Street. Except for the center line, the lanes
were un1narked on the highway (Exhibit D). The east
curb line of 2nd West Street north of Ninth South
Street is 22 feet east of where it would be if it
followed the extension of the east curb line of 2nd
West Street south of 9th South. A bicyclist then, to
continue along the curb, as he is required by statute and
ordinance to do, would necessarily turn in a northeasterly
direction across 9th South Street in order to reach the
curb line continuing north on 2nd West Street. The location of the probable point of impact shows that the deceased boy was driving due north in the inside lane of
traffic and was not proceeding parallel to the pedestrian
lane as he would normally be expected to do. Adamson or
any other driver would normally see the car coming thru
the intersection and see no light behind it and 'vould
drive watching for pedestrians in the pedestrian lane or
bicyclists near it. The impact occurred at a location in
the middle of the road where Adamson as a reasonable
driver would not expect a bicyclist to be. An impact with
a bicycle without lights in a location where it is not supposed to be certainly does not denote failure to keep a
lookout.
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The charge that the defendant Adan1son failed to
yield to Sylvester Kanon 1nust include two ele1nents :
(1) that Sylvester Kanon had the right of 'vay and (2)
that Adan1son actually failed to yield to Kanon, and in
so doing acted recklessly with a marked disregard of
the safety of Kanon. The statute pertaining to the right
of way provides (Rev. Stat. Utah, 1933, Sec. 57-7-31):
"The driver of a vehicle 'vi thin an intersection
intending to turn to the left shall yield to any
vehicle approaching fron1 the opposite direction
which is within the intersection or so close thereto
as to constitute an im1nediate hazard, but such
driver having so yielded and ha~ving gi1.·en a
signal 'lch en and as required b:v law 1nay make
such left turn, and other vehicles approaching the
intersection from the opposite direction shall yield
to the driver making the left tttrn." (Italics
added.)
The court gave part of this law in the Fifth subsection of its Instruction No. 5, but failed to give the
italicized balance of it. So far as determining the right
of way is concerned the record is blank as to the respective location of the truck and the bicycle immediately
prior to the truck's entering of the intersection. The jury
is left to conjecture as to how fast the bicycle was going;
115 we know that the truck was going slowly; we also know
114 that a Model "A" Ford car preceded the bicycle through
81 the intersection going north. Moulton says that the defendant's truck in front of him slowed on entering the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20
Trans. Page

intersection. Thomas Fowler said it slowed down for
120 the red light, which was green when Adamson \Vent into
the intersection. Whether it slowed in order to yield to the.
automobile, we do not know. Neither do we know, however, that it did not so yield. If it did, and the bicycle was
then approaching the intersection, then the rider of the
bicycle had a duty to yield to the truck when the latter
120 was making the left turn. The Model ''A'' Ford going
north was stopped for the red light at the intersection.
Starting up from a dead stop it could not have gone very
fast through the intersection. Could not the Adamson
truck in slo,ving down for the red light to turn green,
have been yielding to the Ford automobile1 In such a
case where almost everything is left to conjecture the
rule of the Gutheil case, supra, should be applied:
''A criminal case requires proof of each element
of the crime by evidence that convinces one beyond
all reasonable doubt of the existence of each such
element."
4. The fourth charge that the defendant was driving without due caution and circumspection and at such
a speed and in such a manner as to endanger the person
and property of Sylvester Kanon does not allege any
factual infraction of law and is in a way a summary of
the three preceding definite charges. In the light of
State v. Lingman (97 Utah 180, 91 P. (2d) 457), the
fourth charge becomes an allegation of recklessness, like
the first three, to mean that Adamson acted with criminal
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negligence, that his actions were ''reckless, or in marked
disregard for the safety of others.''
It should be noted that the whole prosecution of this
case was done under the theory that the defendant committed an unlawful act not amounting to a felony. This
theory is described in the Ling man case as arm (a) of
the manslaughter statute :
''Involuntary rnanslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice, in the commission of (a) an unlawful act not a1nounting to
a felony, o-r (b) in the com1nission of a lawful act
'vhich might produce death, (1) in an unlawful
n1anner or (2) vvithout due caution and circumspection. ''
The distinct characteristic of arm (a) under this case is
that the conduct must be reckless and must evince a
marked disregard for the safety of others, whereas that
of arm (b) is that the act must be one that has knowable
and apparent potentialities for resulting in death.
The entire prosecution of this ·case was under the
theory of arm (a) of the statute. Nowhere in the bill of
particulars is there an allegation that the defendant was
committing a lawful act which might produce death or an
act fraught with potentialities for producing death. This
Court in the Lingman case, supra, pointed the way to a
proper allegation under the arm (b) of the statute, an act
fraught with potentialities for producing death:
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"If forty n1iles an hour had been a la,vful
speed, then the allegation that -it was dangerous to
h,un~an life, plus the allegation in the second paragraph of the hill that 'defendant failed to keep a
proper and sufficient lookout ahead and failed to
observe the course of his automobile to see if it
was obstructed,' 'vould allege the necessary lack
of 'due care and circumspection' which, added to
the lawful speed w-ith potentiality for producing
death, would present a situation for an instruction
under arm (b). '' (Italics added.)
Neither did the court in its instructions include a
standard under arm (b) of the statute, and it refused
defendant's requested Instruction No. 8:
''You are instructed that the 'vords 'act
which might produce death' which are used in the
statute defining involuntary manslaughter, do not
mean every act which theoretically might produce death. These words must be considered by
you to mean an act which has knowable and apparent potentialities for resulting in death.''
And in its Instruction No. 4 the court expressly limited
the charge to the (a) arm of the statute:
"You are instructed that involuntary manslaughter, insofar as material to this case, is defined by the laws of the State of Utah as the unlawful killing of a hu1nan being, without malice,
in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony, when such unlawful act is committed by the defendant in such manner as to
evince on his part marked disregard for the safety
of others, or recklessness.''
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The fourth charge of the bill of particulars, that
the defendant was driving without due caution and circumspection and at such a speed and in such a manner as
to endanger the person and property of Sylvester Kanon,
must also come under the (a) arm of the manslaughter
statute, and the State had the burden of proving that
such driving was reckless, or in marked disregard for
the safety of others. Nothing was proved to show such
driving.
The State's charge rests, therefore, upon these three
alleged infractions of the law as set forth in the bill of
particulars:
1. Excessive speed.
2.

Failure to keep a lookout.

3.

Failure to yield to the deceased.

In none of these particulars does the record show
any evidence of a reckless conduct or conduct evincing
a marked disregard for the safety of others.
When we summarize the evidence the only facts we
have are that some time before the accident somewhere
between 3rd South and 9th South Streets, Adamson was
driving at a maximum of 35 to 40 miles per hour and
that there was a collision between his truck and a bicyclist. How can such evidence justify a court's refusal
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to grant defendant's motion to dismiss the charge! There
is clearly no reckless conduct shown at all; certainly not
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The district court erred then in denying defendant's
109, 14 motion to dismiss, and in denying defendant's motion for
123, 17 a directed verdict. It further erred in denying defend55, 61 ant's motio11: in arrest of judgment on the ground that the
facts proved at .the trial failed to prove the defendant
guilty of the crime charged, and finally it erred in deny59, 61 ing defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground that
the verdict was contrary to the evidence.
II.

THE COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING THE
JURY.

The court erred in giving the Fifth subsection of
its Instruction No. 5, relating to the right of way, and in
failing to submit to the jury all of the law pertaining to
right of way. (Specifications of Error Nos. 6, 7.)
1.

The subsection as it was given to the jury is as follows:
44

''Fifth: That it shall be unlawful for the
driver of a vehicle within an intersection 'vho
intends to turn left to fail to yield to any vehicle
approaching from the opposite direction which is
within the intersection or so close thereto as to
constitute an immediate hazard.''
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This charge, 'vhich purported to set out the applicable statute, omitted part of the vital provision of this
statute (Rev. Stat. of Utah 1933, Sec. 57-7-31), which
reads as follows :
''The driver of a vehicle within an intersection intending to turn to the left shall yield to any
vehicle approaching from the opposite direction
which is within the intersection or so close thereto
as to constitute an immediate hazard, but such
dri.ver having so yielded and having given a signal
when and as required by law, 1nay 1nake such left
turn, and other vehicles approach,ing the intersection from the opposite direction shall yield to
the driver making the left turn.''
The part we have italicized was omitted from the court's
instructions.
(a) Here is a manifest error of giving an instruction unsupported by evidence. There is nothing in the case
to indicate the location of the bicyclist immediately before Adamson's turn to the left, or to show whether he
was within the intersection or so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard. There is nothing to indicate
how fast the bicyclist was peddling at this time or how
slowly the truck was going except that it was proceeding
slowly. To conclude from the fact that there was a
collision that the bicyclist was so close to the intersection
as to constitute an immediate hazard is to beg the issue.
If that conclusion followed, every driver making a left
turn who had a collision would be found guilty of violatSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ing this section of the statute. It was improper to include
this charge at all in the instructions.
To what extent did the bicyclist have the right of
way~ He was violating the law in at least two particulars
in failing to have a light on his bicycle and in failing
to keep on the right side of the road. The law requires
(Rev. Stat. of Utah, 1933, Sec. 57-7-22):
''In driving upon the right half of a highway,
the driver shall drive as closely as practicable to
the right hand edge or curb of the highway, except when overtaking or passing another vehicle in
position to make a left turn.''
The Salt Lake City ordinances in force at that time
provided:
111

''Persons riding bicycles upon any of the
public streets of this city must observe the same
rules for the use of said streets that apply to
drivers of vehicles, except when by their very
nature they are inapplicable, and riders of bicycles upon said streets, and every person driving
a vehicle or electric trolley coach, except electric
coaches in the business districts, shall drive as
closely as practicable to the right-hand edge or
curb of the street, except when overtaking
or passing another vehicle or bicycle, or when
placing a vehicle or bicycle in a position to n1ake
a left turn. '' (Italics ours.)
In Dixon v. Bergin, 64 Utah 195, 228 Pac. 744, this
court approved in a civil case the giving in an instruction
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of a Salt Lake City ordinance requiring bicycles to keep
close to the right hand gutter. It said:
'' _.'-\s pointed out in a recent decision of this
court, ordinances regulating travel upon our
streets Inay becon1e absolutely necessary . . .
\\.,.-here, therefore, vehicles can be classified and
different portions of the street can be set apart
for different classes of vehicles, and the city authorities, in the interest of public safety, dee1n it
proper to do so, the courts are bound to enforce
all such reasonable regulations.''
99

We have already indicated that the supposed point
of impact located the bicyclist on a line practically due
north of the point where he passed the Fowlers near the
east curb of Second West south of 9th South. The
89, Fowlers testified that the bicyclist was going north. His
115 duty under the statute and the Salt Lake City ordinance
was to turn sharply to the right upon reaching 9th South
Street. In failing to do so, did he still retain his right of
way, if he had it originally~ Does a driver always retain
a right of way, no matter what his position~ Would
he have retained his right of way if he had been entirely
on the left side of the road in the lane for south bound
traffic~ If not, then at what point would he lose his
right of way~ Did Kanon have a right of way over an
oncoming vehicle even though he was riding in the dark
without a light to warn Adamson of his presence~ In
such circumstances discussion of ''right of way'' becomes
incongruous. Yet the court gave an instruction on part
of the law of right of way.
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''A driver can not be required to yield the
right of way when his inability to know and act
is chargeable to the lawless conduct of him who
claims it. '' Andrus r. Hall, 27 Pac. ( 2d) 495, 93
Colo. 526.
The giving of an instruction on the right of way
when there was no evidence of failure to yield the right
of way was error.
In State vs. Johnson, 76 Utah 84, 287 P. 909, there
was insufficient evidence to found a charge of operating
an automobile under the influence of intoxicating liquor,
but the court included that charge with other charges
in its instructions to the jury. This Court held that to
be error, saying :
''The question presented is as to whether error
was committed in submitting to the jury a material issue upon which it is claimed there was
insufficient evidence to support it, and if so,
whether the error was prejudicial. If in a civil
case where several acts of negligence are charged,
each constituting actionable negligence, and the
evidence is insufficient as to one of such acts, but
against objections nevertheless is submitted to the
jury and a general verdict rendered in favor of the
plaintiff, hardly any one would contend that no
prejudice resulted on the ground that the evidence
was sufficient to sustain the verdict on the other
alleged acts. In principle, the matter in hand is
not different. The jury here rendered a general
verdict of guilty 'as charged in the information.'
It thereby found the defendant guilty of an unlawful act not supported or justified by the eviSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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dence. Because the unla,vful act related to or concerned intoxicating liquors does not call for an
abridgtuent of the general rule that to justify a
submission of a material issue to a jury there
n1ust be sufficient evidence to support it, nor as
to the prejudicial effect against 'vho1n it is submitted and a general verdict rendered in favor of
his adversary having the burden of proof. The
general verdict here is not severable. Letting all
the issues as to all of the alleged unlawful acts to
the jury gave them to understand that they could
render a verdict of guilty on any one or all of them,
which 'vas required to be expressed only by a
general verdict. Some of the jurors may have
been induced to join in the verdict on one or more
of the alleged acts, some on other alleged acts,
but on which or on all it is ilnpossible to tell. That
none of the jury was induced to join in the verdict
because of the submission of the issue as to intoxication is also impossible to tell. We .cannot
review a criminal action like an equity case-try
it de novo on the record-and ourselves determine
the guilt or innocence of the defendant, the weight
to be given conflicting evidence, the credibility of
the witnesses, or the weight or credit to be given
the claim or testimony of the defendant. Though
the evidence may a1nply or satisfactorily sustain
the conviction, yet it is not within our province to
determine the guilt of the defendant and in such
case justify erroneous and adverse rulings against
hi1n nonprejudicial. That is to say, if on the
record we think a defendant guilty or ought to
have been convicted, 've Inay not regard any kind
of a trial good enough for him. vV e thus think
the ruling not only erroneous, but also prejudicial.
Its very nature had the tendency and was calculated to do harm, and on the record we cannot
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

30
Trans. Page

say it did no harrn or did not influence the verdict.''
(b). It was even more improper, however, having
included this charge, to leave out a part which was as
pertinent to the evidence as that left in. Certainly there
was as much evidence that Adamson yielded in compliance with the last half of the statute as there was that
114 the bicycle constituted an immediate hazard. A Model
120 ''A'' Ford automobile preceded the bicycle through the
intersection. When Thomas Fowler was asked by the
district attorney, speaking of the defendant Adamson,
"He didn't stop at all for the red lightY" the witness
repeated that Ada1nson turned on the green light, and
answered, ''He slowed down.'' In other words, Adamson
was so close to the intersection while the light was still
red that he had to slow down for it to turn green. Yet the
Model ''A'' Ford which was stopped dead on the other
side of 9th South Street for the light to turn green,
passed the middle of the intersection before Adamson's
truck turned through it. The two cars were so close
together that the court could not arbitrarily say that
the defendant did not yield to this Model ''A'' Ford.
Yet that is what the court did in excluding part of the
statute. Certainly the jury had the right to all of this law.
The court erred in refusing to instruct the jury
in the facts pertaining to the conduct of the deceased as
the proximate cause of the accident. (Specifications of
error Nos. 8-18.)
2.

(a) . Closely related to the proble1n just discussed is
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the failure of the court properly to instruct the jury on
the fact of the deceased's violations of these statutes
and ordinances and the relationship of these violations
to the accident. The court refused to give the following
instructions requested by the defendant:
31

.. Defendant's Reqttested Instruction ]\r o. 1.5.

''You are instructed that a driver rnay presume that others in the road 'vill conduct themselves in a la"rful manner. If you find that though
Sylvester Kanon \vas 'vithin the intersection or so
close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard he was riding his bicycle in an unlawful manner and that it was because of his so riding in an
unlawful manner that the defendant Grant Adamson failed to see him, then you must find that the
defendant Adamson did not act unlawfully In
failing to yield to Sylvester Kanon.''

36

"Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 20.
"You are instructed that the Salt Lake City
ordinances provide that riders of bicycles upon
the city streets shall drive as closely as practicable
to the right hand edge or curb of the street except
'vhen overtaking or passing another vehicle or
bicycle, or when placing a vehicle or bicycle in a
position to n1ake a left turn.''

37

"Defendant's Requested lnstr1tction No. 21.
''You are instructed that if you find the deceased bicyclist was not follo,ving as closely to the
right hand curb of the street as practicable, then
you must find that he did not have the right of
way over the defendant.''
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These three instructions clearly presented to the
court the propositon that a bicyclist does not always have
the right of way regardless of what his position might
be within the intersection. We submit that the court erred
in not giving these instructions to the jury.
On the law that a bicyclist riding in the dark without
a lighted lamp did not have the right of way over an
oncoming vehicle, the court had the opportunity to give
the jury defendant's requested instruction No.15, already
quoted, as well as requested instructions 12, 13, 14, and
16. These instructions were particularly necessary,
however, not only to present fully the question of the
right of way, but also to determine whether Kanon's
negligence, rather than the defendant's, was the cause
of the accident. The requested instructions follow:
28

"Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 12.
"You are instructed that the law requires
that, 'Every bicycle upon a highway during the
period from a half hour after sunset to a half
hour before sunrise shall be equipped with a
lighted lamp on the front thereof visible under
normal atmospheric conditions from a distance
of at least three hundred feet in front of such
bicycle '. ' '

29

"Defendant·'s Requested Instruction No. 13.
"You are instructed that if you find that at
the time of the accident Sylvester Kanon was
riding a bicycle which was not equipped with a
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lighted lamp, that such riding· '\\'"as unlawful, and
if you find that his so riding 'vas the proximate
cause of his death you n1ust find the defendant
not guilty.''

30

''Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 14.
''You are instructed that if -YOU find that
Sylvester Kanon drove a bicycle at the time of
the accident 'vhich was not equipped with a lighted
lan1p on the front thereof, his riding the bicycle in
that manner was negligence and should be considered by you in connection with all other matters pertaining to the said accident."

,·

32

"Defendant's Requested Instruct-ion No. 16.
''You are instructed that the law does not
require a person to anticipate or guard against
events which are not reasonably to be expected,
nor does the law require a person to regulate his
conduct with reference to the conduct of another
person 'vhich is not reasonably to be expected.''

The sun that evening set at 7 :40. Witness Moulton
73 had left the ice cream parlor between 3rd and 4th South
Streets shortly after eight o'clock. Particularly with the
evidence of darkness, the court should have instructed
the jury as to the bicyclist's negligence in violating
the statute requiring a lighted lamp on the bicycle. Certainly there was enough evidence to require the court at
least to submit to the jury the question of the violation
and of the bicyclist's negligence.

111
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Laws of Utah 1935, Chapter 48, Page 121, Sec. 57-755 provides as follows :
"(1). Every vehicle upon a highway during

the period froin a half hour after sunset to a
half hour before sunrise, and at any other tin1e
when there is not sufficient light to render clearly discernible any person on the highway at a
distance of 200 feet ahead, shall be equipped
with lighted front and rear lamps as in this section respectively required for different classes of
vehicles, subject to exemption with reference to
lights on parked vehicles as declared in subsection (11) . . .
"(10). Every bicycle upon a highway during
the period from a half hour after sunset to a half
hour before sunrise shall be equipped with a lighted lamp on the front thereof visible under normal
atmospheric conditions from a distance of at least
300 feet in front of such bicycle and shall also be
equipped with a reflector or lamp on the rear exhibiting a red light visible under like conditions
from a distance of at least 200 feet to the rear of
such bicycle. ' '

These instructions were not requested for the purpose of showing contributory negligence on the part of
the bicyclist.

They were pertinent because they would

permit the jury to determine 'vhether or not under the
circumstances the defendant Adamson was negligent.
There is all the difference in the world between riding
down a bicyclist in broad daylight and in striking a biSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cyclist in the dark 'vhen he is not 'vhere he lawfully should
be.
In People vs. Cantpbell, 212 N. W. 97, 237

~fich.

244,

the Supretne Court reversed a conviction of involuntary
manslaughter because the lower court had taken from the
jury the facts sho,ving the deceased's negligence, saying:
"The defendant 'vas driving 6 feet from the
curb. The night \\Tas dark and 1nisty. H·e testified that he was keeping a lookout, hut that he
assumed that no person would be 'valking out in
that part of the highway "There he was driving.
The deceased were not crossing the highway. They
'vere "Talking 6 feet fron1 the eurb, 'vith their backs
to approaching cars. 'Ve think it 'vas for the
jury to say 'vhether, under all of the circumstances, they were using ordinary care for their
own safety in walking 6 feet out from the curb,
in a dark and misty atmosphere, on an extensively
traveled highway, with their backs to approaching
automobiles. Considering the darkness, the misty
atmosphere, the slippery condition of the pavement, their position in the highway, the fact that
there was a safer place to 'valk, and their knowledge of the fact that automobiles would be constantly overtaking them fron1 the rear, 'vere the
deceased, at the time of accident, using ordinary
care for their o'vn safety"? If the~T 'vere not, that
fact would not be a defense, but it would be an
important factor in the case, which the defendant
would be entitled to have the jury consider.''
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In People v. Barnes, 182 Mich. 179, 148 N. W. 400, the
court held it reversible error to withhold from the jury
the conduct of the deceased, saying:
''While the claimed contributory negligence
of Mary Robb is no defense in this case, yet it does
not follow that her conduct should be eliminated
from the case; it should be considered as bearing
upon the claimed culpable negligence of the respondent, and the question should all the time be:
'' 'Was respondent responsible under the law,
whether Mary Robb's failure to use due care contributed to her injury or not¥' ''
A California Court of Appeals (People v. Hurley,
56 Pac. (2d) 978, 13 Cal. App. (2d) 208 pointed out that
the convicted appellant was driving on his own right-hand
side of the road and the deceased whom he struck was
walking on the wrong side of the road, and said:
"While contributory negligence of the deceased is no defen~e in a manslaughter prosecution, still it may have an important bearing on the
degree of culpability of appellant. The law required Schwitz to walk close to his left hand edge
of the roadway. Section 564, Vehicle Code. Had
he obeyed the law there would have been no collision as he would not have been in the path of the
Cord. Appellant had the right to assume that
pedestrians would obey the law and that no one
would be walking down the road in the path of his
automobile. While this would not excuse him from
keeping a vigilant watch of the roadway in front
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of his car, it has an important bearing on the
degree of his lack of care.
'' Under the facts of this case, and the decisions we have cited, 've have reached the conclusion that the evidence shows appellant guilty
of only the lack of the exercise of ordinary care,
and not of gross indifference to or such a disregard
of the safety of others as is necessary to constitute criminal negligence. It follows that the
judg1nent pronounced upon him upon his conviction of involuntary manslaughter, and the order
denying his motion for new trial made in that
case, must be reversed.''
The same question was ruled upon in the case of
State v. Sisneros, 82 Pac. (2d) 274, 42 N. Mex. 500. The
court reversed the conviction, saying:
"While the defendant is not excused by the
contributory negligence of Chavez, yet that negligence should have been taken into consideration
by the jury in determining the proximate cause of
the death of Chavez (citing cases), and the court
should have so instructed the jury.
''Chavez was inviting disaster when he
parked his car on the highway, without lights.
The sudden turning on in the dark of the lights
of an unseen car is startling to the driver of a
closely approaching automobile and is likely to
cause him to swerve from his course ...
''The action of the jury can be accounted for
by the seriousness of the tragedy, and the failure
of the court to instruct it under either count, that
the unlawful act charged must have been the
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proximate cause of the death of Chavez: and his
failure to instruct specifically on defendant's
theory of the case, regarding the flashing of the
lights and consequent blinding of the defendant
which was his only affirmative defense; and his
failure to instruct upon the negligence of Chavez
as bearing upon the question of whether any
criminal negligent act of defendant was the proximate cause of Chavez' death; neither of which
was requested or given. This cannot be considered as error, because not called to the attention of the district court or presented here; but
it probably accounts for the verdict."
The Tennessee court in Copeland v. Stat~, 285 S. W.
565, 49 A. L. R. 605, likewise held it reversible error not
to charge that it must appear that the death was not the
result of misadventure, saying:
''The contributory negligence of the boy
would not relieve Copeland of the consequence of
his unlawful act . . . But the conduct of the boy
was entitled to consideration in determining
whether under the circumstances, Copeland's negligence was the proximate cause of death or
whether death resulted from an unavoidable accident."
In State v. Bowser, 124 Kan. 556, 261 Pac. 846, the
court said:
''The court correctly instructed that the negligence of Anderson, if any, was no defense to thr
alleged crime of Bowser, but the instruction was
somewhat lame in failing to state that the decedent's negligence, if shown, should be conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sidered 'vith all the other evidence to detern1ine
whether so1ne negligent act or o1nission of defendant ~s \\~a~ or \Va~ not the proxhnate cause of
Anderson's death, or \vhether, under the circunl~tances, defendant ~s aet \Vas negligent at all.''
Defendant's requested Instructions numbered 12, 13, 14,
15, 16, 17, 20 and 21 should therefore have been given.
In line with the authorities just cited the lower court
should have given defendant's requested Instruction
No. 10, and erred in refusing it. This instruction reads as
follows:
''You are instructed that even if you were to
be convinced that the defendant on1itted to perform a duty, nevertheless if an unlawful act or
negligent act of another person intervened between the omission of the defendant and the death
and was the direct cause of the death, then you
must find the defendant not guilty."
The lower court in refusing this probably had in mind a
conception of the contributory negligence doctrine, but
it totally failed to see the necessity of the instruction in
determining the proximate cause of the decedent's death.
The jury were entitled to all of the facts, including the
deceased's negligence, to determine what was the cause
of the accident. Among these facts were that the deceased was violating an ordinance and statute in riding
as he did. This is another reason, too, that the requested
instructions No. 15, 20, 21, and 12 (heretofore quoted)
should have been given.
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In Dunville v. State, 123 N. E. 689, cited in the first
section of this brief, the defendant motorcyclist killed a
child who ran into the street in front of him. The Indiana
Supreme Court said:
''Counsel for the state say that contributory
negligence of the child has nothing to do with th~
case. This is true in a sense. It is not a question
of contributory negligence. Of course we know
that a child 2 years and 9 months old is not
sui juris, and cannot be guilty of negligence, m·
contributory negligence, in the ordinary sense of
those terms; but the conduct of this child, in the
circumstances shown by the evidence, is just as
cogent in breaking down the intent which the law
imputes to appellant after the event as like conduct on the part of an adult in like circumstances
would be in repelling such imputation. It is not
a question of contributory negligence, but it is
one of proximate cause.
''So the question is, Did appellant conduct
himself at the time and place in such a manner as
to show a willful and wanton disregard for the
rights of others, from which the law infers an
intent to cause death, and did his conduct cause
the death ...
''The most the evidence discloses is negligence
on the part of appellant. For aught that appears
in this case the proximate cause of Frances Held's
death was the fact that she ran in front of appellant's motorcycle and suddenly stopped. For
aught that is shown by the evidence, the accident
would have occurred had appellant been proceeding in the most careful manner.''
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Faced suddenly with the appearance of a bicycle before him, in a place where the bicycle was not legally
supposed to be, and 'vould not be expected, the defendant
Adamson 'vas in an en1ergency not of his own making.
Just as in State v. Gutheil, supTa, in "~hich case defendant
was suddenly faced with an automobile illegally being
pushed across the highway, so here Adamson was suddenly faced with an unlighted bicycle out in the middle
of the road behind an automobile.

In such an emer-

gency Adamson should not have been expected to exercise
the degree of care that would be expected had not this
emergency arisen. While there is no evidence of lack of
care on the part of Grant Adamson, there is evidence
of the emergency created by the negligent driving of the
bicyclist. Therefore the court should have given to the
jury defendant's requested instruction No. 17:
33

"You are instructed that when a person is
placed without negligence on his part suddenly
in a position of peril without sufficient time to
consider all of the circumstances, that law does not
require of him the same degree of care and caution that it requires of a person who has ample
opportunity for the full exercise of his judgn1ent
and reasoning facilities.''
The court erred also in refusing to give, in connection

36 with defendant's requested instruction No. 20, defend-.
ant's requested instructions Nos. 18 and 19 :
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"Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 18.

34

"You are instructed that the Salt Lake Cih
Ordinances provide that riders of bicycles upo~
the city streets shall drive as closely as practicable
to the right hand edge or curb of the street except when overtaking or passing another vehicle
or bicycle, or when placing a vehicle or bicycle in
a position to make a left turn. You are instructed
that if you find that the deceased bicyclist violated the ordinance mentioned in Instruction
No. ______ you shall find him negligent, and if his
negligence was the proximate cause of his death,
you shall find the defendant not guilty.''
35

''Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 19.
"You are instructed that if you find that the
deceased bicyclist viola ted the ordinance mentioned in Instruction No. ______ you shall find him
negligent, and if his negligence was the proximate
cause of his death, you shall find the defendant
not guilty.''
3.

The court, in modifying defendant's requested i~

struction No.9, cast the burden of proof upon defendant.
(Specification of error No. 19.)
The court erred in refusing defendant's requested
25 instruction No. 9:
''You are instructed that in determining
whether or not the defendant was guilty of criminal negligence as that term is defined to you in
other instructions you should consider the conduct of Sylvester Kanon immediately prior to
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gether with all the other facts and circumstances
surrounding the accident.''

46 The court modified that in its Instruction No. 7a and
added these \vords:
"'If you believe from all the evidence in the case
that· the sole proximate cause of the injuries to
and the death of the said Sylvester Kanon was a
result of the acts and conduct of the said Sylvester Kanon, then you should return a verdict of
not guilty.''
This was prejudicial error. It had the effect of shifting
the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant.
In State v. Laris, 78 Utah 183, 2 Pac. (2d) 243, this court
held that it was error to give a certain instruction because
it cast upon the defendant the burden of establishing the
good faith of a person, saying:
''As the burden of proof to establish the
commission of a crime necessarily extends to
every essential element of the crime, the burden
is, of course, with the state to overcome that presumption beyond a reasonable doubt.
''A very similar question \Vas before the
Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, in the
case of Drossos v. U. 8., 2 F. (2) 538. An instruction that, if the jury was convinced that the accused's relationship with the woman was innocent, and that he had no intention of having immoral relations with her, he should be acquitted.
It was held that the instruction was erroneous
and prejudicial in shifting the burden of proof
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on the accused, and that the error was not cured
by an instruction that the accused is presumed to
be innocent until he is proved guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, and, in case of a reasonable
doubt as to whether his guilt is satisfactorily
sho"\\rn, he is entitled to an acquittal."
The Instruction No. 7a given by the court in the
case at bar eliminated all possibilities of the defendant's
being found not guilty other than that the death of
Sylvester Kanon was a result of the acts and conduct
of Sylvester Kanon. It laid undue emphasis upon the
duty of the jury to find that his acts "were the sole
proximate cause" of the injury and death.
The court, in refusing to give defendant's requested instruction No.3, denied to the jury a needed clarification of two definitions of care already given them.
(Specification of error No. 20.)
4.

The court erred in refusing to give defendant's requested Instruction No. 3 :
19

"You are instructed that the words, 'Without
due caution and circumspection' as used in the
Statute of the State of Utah defining the offense
of involuntary manslaughter must be construed
as meaning 'criminal negligence'.''
In the first and second subdivisions of its Instruction
No.5, the court set forth provisions of the statutes which,
taken together without explanation, led the jury to assume that there are two standards of care, a violation of
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either of which should permit conviction. The first subdivision sets forth the true standard of care in an Involuntary Inanslaughter action:
'"You are instructed that the laws of the
State of Utah in force on the 5th day of August,
1940, provide as follows :
''First: That it shall be unlawful for any person to drive any vehicle upon any highway carelessly and heedlessly in wilful or wanton disregard of the rights and safety of others.''
The second, however, reads as follows:
"Second: That it shall be unla\vful for any
person to drive any vehicle upon any highway
without due caution and circumspection and at
such a speed or in such a manner as to endanger
any person or property.''
Instruction No. 6 required for conviction that the
jury find that the violation of the statutes was reckless or
was an act evincing a marked disregard for the safety of
others. This to a lawyer would have the effect of giving
to the second subdivision of Instruction No. 5 the same
meaning as that of the first subdivision of that instruction. However, the effect on a jury of laymen of these
two standards placed next to each other is to emphasize
some distinction between the two standards of the first
and second subdivisions: the standard of (1) acting with
"wilful or wanton disregard'' and (2) that of acting
"without due caution and circumspection." A definition
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of the words "without due caution and circumspection"
was necessary, and the court erred in refusing defendant's requested Instruction No. 3. ''Criminal negligence'' was defined by the court in its Instruction No. 10,
but "due caution and circumspection" was not defined.
The giving of defendant's requested Instruction No. 3
was a needed clarification of the law, and its omission was
prejudicial error.
CONCLUSION
The prosecution rested its whole case upon four alleged violations of the statute by the defendant, Adamson. In all of these four it failed to prove any violation
by the defendant and the court should have granted
plaintiff's motion to dismiss, plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict, plaintiff's motion for new trial and plaintiff's motion in arrest of judgment.

In addition to its failure to recognize that the State
did not prove a public offense the court erred in the
following particulars :
It included in its instructions a charge quoting
part of the statute pertaining to the right of way, though
(1).

there was no evidence of failure to yield the right of wa~<
Not only did it do this but it failed to include all of the
law on the right of way and gave only that part which
assumed in itself that the defendant did not yield.
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( 2).

It failed to give to the jury all of the facts per-

taining to the accident and in particular:
(a). That the boy's riding a bicycle after dark without a lighted lamp was negligence and was illegal:
(b). That the boy's crossing an intersection in the
middle of the road at a place where he was not supposed
to be was negligence and was illegal.
(3). It shifted the burden of proof In modifying
defendant's requested Instruction No.9.
(4).

In refusing to give defendant's requested in-

struction No.3, defining the phrase "without due caution
and circumspection,'' it deprived the jury of necessary
clarification of standards of care in a manslaughter
action and led the jury to assume that the defendant,
Adamson, should be judged by a standard of care used
in civil negligence cases.
In short, under the meager facts adduced at the trial
and the insufficient instructions which were given to the
jury by the court, Adamson should be found as a matter
of law not guilty of the ''reckless handling, or conduct
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evincing a marked disregard for the safety of others,"
that this court has required in the Gutheil and Lingmom
cases for conviction of involuntary manslaughter.
Respectfully submitted,

MOYLE, RICHARDS & McKAY,
Attorneys for Defendant and
Appellant.
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